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This paper investigates the impact of judiciaries on firms’ contracting behaviour and 
economic performance. In 2002, the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act was 
enacted in India to facilitate speedy disposal of civil suits. Some State High Courts 
had already enacted some of the amendments contained in this reform a long time 
ago. This spatial variation in the reform’s implementation is used to identify the effect 
of judicial quality on firm’s behavior. Using small informal firm data, I find that the 
reform led to fewer breaches of contract, encouraged investment, facilitated access 
to finance, and expanded rental markets. 
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This paper provides new evidence on the impact of slow judiciaries on economic
performance using a unique data set assembled after a major Indian judicial reform
implemented in 2002. The existing literature does not provide a clear assessment of
the empirical e¤ects of slow judiciaries on economic activity because it is hard to nd
a source of variation in judicial e¢ ciency that would help identify the latters impact
on rmsbehavior. The Indian judicial reform studied in our paper seeks to simplify
and shorten the procedural handling of court cases as specied in the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is composed of 88 Code amendments, all of which have been carefully
examined and classied in this paper. Several amendments had previously been im-
plemented in some States due to the latters right to locally amend the Code of Civil
Procedure. Thus, cross-State variation in reform implementation can be used to isolate
the impact of the judiciary on economic activity. The cross-State variation in reform
implementation is related to the contracting behavior of 520,000 small informal non-
agricultural rms measured in detail in the 2000 and 2002 Rounds of Indias National
Sample Survey. A di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach allows a comparison of outcomes of
both judiciaries and rms prior to and after 2002 in States which have passed several
of the 2002 Acts amendments and States which have not. One amendment intended
to simplify procedures, among 38 such amendments contained in the 2002 Amendment
Act, improved rm performance by 1.7 percent. The total cross-State variation in this
reform implementation caused an improvement in rm performance by 9.7 percent.
Slow judiciaries may signicantly inuence the contracting behavior of rms. First,
incentives to cooperate in a contractual agreement might weaken because slower judicia-
ries make the discounted value of punishment from deviation lower. Second, incentives
to invest might decrease if there is a possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behav-
ior by a rms partner once the investment costs are sunk (Klein et al, 1978). Third,
slow judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior of borrowers. Creditors
might respond to this strategic behavior by reducing the availability of credit (Pagano et
al, 2002). Fourth, if enforcing a rental agreement takes time, it gives renters bargaining
power, which they can use to reduce future rents. Anticipating this, owners may ration
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their supply of rental goods (Casas-Arce et al, 2005). Of course, individuals often nd
ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse
e¤ects of weak contracting institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2005). The magnitude of the
impact of slow judiciaries on economic outcomes is therefore an empirical matter. The
2000 and 2002 Rounds of Indias National Sample Survey contains detailed information
on the occurrence of contract breaches, investment decisions, credit access and produc-
tion goods ownership of small informal non-agricultural rms. The impact of judiciarys
speed on these four dimensions may therefore be measured by comparing rms in States
having previously passed many of the 2002 Acts amendments, in contrast to rms in
States not having passed any, before and after the reform.
Djankov et al (2003) have made an important contribution to the study of courts.
They measured judicial formalism in 109 countries around the world. They found ju-
dicial formalism greater in countries with civil rather than common law systems and
that it is associated with a lack of consistency, honesty and fairness in judicial deci-
sions. Endogeneity concerns were addressed by using legal origin as an instrument for
judicial formalism. Acemoglu et al (2005) use the same data to relate judicial e¢ ciency
to economic outcomes using legal origin as an instrumental variable. They nd that
contracting institutions have no impact on economic performance once property rights
institutions are controlled for. This paper di¤ers from Acemoglu et al (2005) in two ways.
First, it uses a within-country analysis of India. By limiting myself to one country, I
am able to control for a range of factors and inuences that cannot be as convincingly
controlled for in cross country data. This allows me to identify the e¤ect of judicial
e¢ ciency independently from that of laws, legal origins, and other country-wide char-
acteristics. Second, it generates clear policy implications regarding the desirability of
reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the literature attempting to measure the impact of judiciaries on economic perfor-
mance, none of the papers deal with the potential endogeneity of the judicial ine¢ ciency
measures. Much of the literature exploits spatial variation in the quality of a partic-
ular institution to identify its e¤ect on economic activity. Knack and Keefer (1995)
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relate professional country risk measures provided by business experts to judicial qual-
ity measures, which is the amount of contract-intensive money (the di¤erence between
M2 and cash). However, it may be, for example, that States having generally better
policies are also more likely to have e¢ cient judiciaries. If this is the case, judicial qual-
ity merely reects better economic policies and in itself may be insignicant in driving
better economic outcomes. Jappelli et al (2005) present a model of the e¤ect of judicial
enforcement on credit markets and then test it using panel data from Italian provinces.
The authors found, among other things, that the duration of civil trials (measured by
actual duration in the past) as well as the stock of pending civil trials per inhabitant are
negatively correlated with loans granted to domestic companies and positively correlated
with measures of credit constraints. Cristini et al (2001) relate di¤erences in judicial
e¢ ciency across Argentinean provinces to the size of provincial credit markets. Caste-
lar Pinheiro et al (2001) perform a similar analysis in Brazil. In none of these papers
is there an attempt to deal with the potential endogeneity of the judicial ine¢ ciency
measures. My paper, in contrast, examines a particular reform made to the Code of
Civil Procedure and its implementation variation across States in order to account for
potential endogeneity in the judicial system.
One notable exception is Visaria (2006) where a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy
based on two sources of variation (the monetary threshold for claims to be eligible for
these tribunals and the staggered introduction of tribunals across Indian states) is used
to show that the establishment of tribunals reduces delinquency in loan repayment by
between 3 and 11 percent. This paper di¤ers from Visaria (2006) in two ways. First,
I show explicitly the link between the reform and increased judicial speed. Second, I
relate the reform to credit access but also to other outcomes such as the occurrence of
contract breaches, investment decisions and production goods ownership.
The main ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. One amendment
simplifying or shortening the procedural handling of court cases decreased by 676 the
number of cases pending per judge in the Lower Courts, which represents 35 percent of
a workload. This indicates that the reform was successful in reducing case backlog. An
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extra amendment decreases the probability of experiencing a breach of contract by 12
percent, increases the probability of investing in plant and machinery assets (as well as
tools, other xed assets, transport and equipment assets) by 13 percent, the probability
of obtaining a loan from a formal nancial institution by 8 percent, the probability of
renting tool assets by 17 percent. Experiencing less breaches of contract, investing more,
having a better access to nancial markets and to thicker rental markets may positively
a¤ect economic performance. This paper shows that moving a rm from the State that
had already passed the most amendments, and consequently with the weakest e¤ect of
the 2002 Amendment Act, to the State that had passed no amendments improved rm
performance by 9.7 percent.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 explores the channels through
which judicial quality a¤ects rmseconomic performance. I examine four prominent
aspects in the life of a rm: breaches of contract, investment decisions, access to credit
markets and ownership of production goods. Section 2 describes the 2002 Amendment
Act and details the papers identication strategy. Section 3 provides background on
the 55th and 57th rounds of Indias National Sample Survey on non-agricultural in-
formal enterprises. Section 4 presents the papers empirical method. Section 5 exposes
results pertaining to rmsbehavior. Section 6 discusses the e¤ects on rm performance.
Section 7 concludes.
1 Related literature
In this section, the theoretical literature on the potential impact of slow judiciaries
on rms contracting behavior is briey summarized. Four possible mechanisms are
described: breaches of contract, investment decisions, access to credit markets and own-
ership of production goods. As Indias National Sample Surveys contains detailed rm-
level information on these four mechanisms, their empirical relevance will be tested in
the empirical section.
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1.1 Breaches of Contract
Many exchanges occur instantly and simultaneously. In this type of exchange, there is
little reason for promises and enforcement means. Promises are made in cases of de-
ferred exchanges. The enforceability of promises encourages exchange and cooperation
among people. For example, the judiciary is an important deterrent to any fraud that
might be more economically attractive in the short run. The probability of harsh pun-
ishment in monetary or non-monetary terms heavily dissuades opportunistic agents to
default ex-post on previous agreements. Slower judiciaries lower the discounted value of
punishment, thereby weakening incentives to cooperate.
This situation can be modelled as an agency game. The rst player, the principal,
decides to put a valuable asset under the control of a second player, the agent. The
agent decides whether to cooperate (produce, give back the valuable asset and share
the trade surplus) or appropriate (keep the valuable asset). Cooperation is productive
whereas appropriation is redistributive. In the absence of any contract enforcement, the
agents best move is to appropriate. Consequently, the principals best move is to not
partake in this game. No activity is undertaken in the absence of enforcement means.
If a contract is signed between the two parties and is enforceable before a court,
payo¤s are radically modied. If the agent breaches, the principal receives compensatory
damages from the agent. If compensatory damages in case of a breach are such that it
is the agents best move to cooperate, then the principals best move is to invest. The
purpose of enforcement is to enable people to cooperate by converting games with non
cooperative solutions into games with cooperative solutions. It is interesting to note that
the prospect of a distant ne due to a slow judiciary reduces incentives to cooperate.
However, the judiciary is not the only means by which to enforce contracts. The fear
of damaging ones reputation may induce parties to adhere to contracts (Bernstein, 1992;
Greif, 1993, Klein et al, 1981). A repeated agency game is used to model this situation.
A grim-trigger strategy played by the principal induces the agent to cooperate. An
enduring relationship does not necessarily require an e¤ective legal system.
This is true in cases of enduring relationships having innite horizons. However, most
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business relationships are open-ended. Open-ended relationships have no predetermined
end. They can persist indenitely or end unexpectedly. They dissolve and reform easily
as circumstances change. Assume that there is an indenite amount of players, who
form themselves into pairs to play each round of the previous agency game. At the end
of each round, relationships continue into the next round or dissolve due to two reasons:
unforeseeable changes or appropriation by the agent. When a relationship dissolves,
players must search for another partner. This may be costly.
Agents can follow two strategies. First, they can cooperate until the relationship is
dissolved by an unforeseeable event, therefore obtaining low and steady payo¤s. Second,
they can appropriate and search for another partner, therefore deriving high but irreg-
ular payo¤s. In a competitive equilibrium, both strategies must earn the same payo¤.
Another condition for a competitive equilibrium is that a principal looking for a partner
must be willing to invest, knowing that he will be matched with a certain probability
with appropriating agents or with cooperating agents, whose relationship has just been
dissolved due to unforeseeable changes. Such an equilibrium exists under reasonable
assumptions (Cooter et al, 2003).
The power of principals to exit from agency relationships makes some cooperation
possible even in open-ended games. However, an e¢ cient judiciary may increase the
amount of cooperation. The low discounted value of a remote punishment given by slow
courts does not act as a deterrent to appropriation. In contrast, by swiftly punishing
breachers, an e¢ cient judiciary raises the agents payo¤ of cooperation. It is interesting
to note that as cooperation is productive, economic production rises. This simple model
predicts that a more e¢ cient judiciary is associated with fewer breaches of contract and
higher economic output.
1.2 Investment
The previous section demonstrated that more contracts are breached when judicial qual-
ity is poor. But one could also expect judicial quality to a¤ect investments undertaken
by rms. I will now consider the case in which a rm undertakes an investment in order
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to supply another with a particular asset. As Klein et al (1978) have emphasized, the
possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior arises. In order to induce a sup-
plier to invest, a rm can either write a long-term contract whose terms are favorable to
the supplier or guarantee exclusivity rights. However, once investment costs are sunk,
there is an immediate incentive for the rm to renege on its contract and capture the
suppliers rents. Alternatively, if the search costs for nding new suppliers are high,
there is an immediate incentive for the supplier to use its monopoly power to impose
higher prices. These frictions may reduce investment incentives; in such cases, as Klein
et al (1978) have concluded, vertical integration will supersede market systems. Another
way of limiting post-contractual opportunistic behavior is to establish e¢ cient judicial
systems which enforce contracts swiftly.
1.3 Access to credit markets
We may also believe that judicial systems impact on rmsdebt contracts. As Pagano
et al (2002) explain:
"The key function of courts in credit relationships is to force solvent
borrowers to repay when they fail to do so spontaneously. By the same token,
poor judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior of borrowers:
anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans easily and
cheaply via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default. Creditors
respond to this strategic behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability
of credit."
A direct implication of this is that faster judiciaries, by imposing higher discounted
values of nes paid by borrowers, foster credit supply. A corollary concerns alternative
nancing means. The model of repeated game agency predicts that individuals will
seek long-run relationships in the absence of adequate State protection. Long term
relationships require commitment. Traditional forms of commitment include friendship
or kinship. Some rms do in fact obtain loans from relatives or business partners. The
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advantage of such creditors over formal nancial institutions is that they better monitor
borrowersactions and reduce the information asymmetry between the two parties. On
the other hand, interest rates can be prohibitive. The model predicts that as the courts
become more e¢ cient, borrowers will turn away from personal relationships in favor of
formal nancial institutions, which are more likely to o¤er credit.
1.4 Rental Markets
Another consequence of judicial ine¢ ciency concerns its impact on allocating ownership
rights (Casas-Arce et al, 2005). In the absence of transaction costs, agents will e¢ ciently
allocate these rights in a way that maximizes welfare. This may involve certain indi-
viduals acquiring ownership over the assets they use, while others will purchase access
from a separate owner on an occasional basis. But when the control transfer is costly to
enforce, in other words when the judiciary is ine¢ cient, we may see departures from that
optimal allocation. Market participants in particular may decide to avoid contractual
disputes by relying less on control transfers in favor of choosing market structures that
rely on more direct ownership by the nal user.
Casas-Arce et al (2005) apply this reasoning to the housing market. In contrast, I
will examine the prevalence of those entrepreneurs who rent their means of production1.
The intuition here is similar and can be briey summarized. A user faces the following
trade-o¤: when renting, he faces risk in uctuating rental prices; when owning, he avoids
risk by holding on to the production good, but faces price risk if he decides to sell it. This
leads to a theory of rental market size. The user likely to keep producing the same good
in the future will own the production good, while the user likely to modify his activity
will want to rent and avoid the good price risk. It is possible to extend this model
to study the e¤ects of e¢ ciency in judicial systems. Enforcing a rental agreement, for
example, by repossessing production goods in cases where renters threaten to withhold
payment, takes time. This gives renters bargaining power, which they may use to reduce
future rents. In anticipation of this, investors, that is, owners of the production good
to be rented, ration their supply if they can discriminate between users. This may have
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important welfare consequences for Indian rms. In the presence of liquidity constraints,
a functional rental market may help poor entrepreneurs start businesses. A broad rental
market may also facilitate mobility across sectors and across regional labor markets,
thus greasing the wheelsof the economy.
To conclude the theoretical component of this paper, I expect ine¢ cient judiciaries to
be associated with more breaches of contract, less investments, more di¢ culty accessing
credit markets, and smaller rental markets. These predictions are testable using the
dataset I will analyze in the following sections. I will now describe the judicial reform
in India that is at the source of judicial speed variation.
2 The Judicial Reform
This paper aims to relate judicial speed to rmsbehavior. One cannot simply relate
the e¢ ciency of the courts to rmsperformance without considering the risk that State
heterogeneity might drive the results more than judiciarys e¢ ciency per se. The 2002
Amendment Act will be used as a source of variation in the quality of the judiciary. I
will now describe this reform and then explain how spatial variation in its cross-State
implementation may be used to identify the e¤ect of judicial speed on economic activity.
2.1 The 2002 Amendment Act
Indias judicial institutions are identical across courts and States. They operate accord-
ing to three levels: a single Supreme Court at the federal level; High Courts at the State
level; and, at lower levels, district judges for civil cases and sessions judges for criminal
cases. The Code of Civil Procedure regulates the functioning of Civil courts by laying
down the rules according to which they are to function These rules may be summarized
as follows: procedures for ling civil cases, court powers to pass various orders, court
fees and stamps involved in ling cases, parties rights to cases, namely plainti¤ and
defendant, the jurisdiction and parameters within which civil courts must function and
specic rules for case proceedings of a case, right of appeal, review or reference. Data
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from 2000 on cases pending indicated that there were 3.1 million cases pending in 21
High Courts and 20 million in subordinate courts2. Examples of judicial slowness are
striking:
the highest court in the country, the Supreme Court, took 11 years to
acquit the headmaster of a school on the charge of taking a bribe for signing
the salary arrears bill of his school. In another case of judicial delay, the
victim was former Union Law Minister, Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. The judgement
came in his lifetime but it took 47 years for the Maharashtra government to
execute the decree passed in his favour against illegal encroachment of his
land by Pakistani refugees. By then he was dead.3
To remedy this situation, Parliament enacted the 2002 Amendment Act to the Civil
procedure Code of 1908 in order to make litigation more e¢ cient. The reform can be
summarized in ve main points. First, it encourages out-of-court dispute settlement.
According to Section 89, a court may, by itself, proactively refer disputes to alterna-
tive dispute resolution methods (arbitration, conciliation, lok adalats, mediation) when
elements of a settlement appear to exist, which may be acceptable to both parties in
the dispute. Second, judicial discretion is restricted in allowing unnecessary delays.
The Amendment Act imposes mandatory time limits on plainti¤s and defendants at
each stage of the litigation. An example may be found in Section 27: "Summons to
defendants.-Where a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the
defendant to appear and answer the claim and may be served in manner prescribed on
such day not beyond thirty days from the date of the institution of the suit". The part
in italics was added by the 2002 Amendment Act. Third, the 2002 Amendment Act
reduces frivolous litigation. Order 16, Rule 16, Sub-rule 4 is inserted: "Verication
of pleadings.-(4) The person verifying the pleadings shall also furnish an a¢ davit in
support of his pleadings". This was conceived to curtail frivolous litigation and thus
increase judicial speed. Fourth, commissions are introduced. Order 26, Rule 4A states
that a commission can be sent by any court to interrogate any person within the local
11
limits of a courts jurisdiction. Before the amendment, commissions, designed to collect
evidence and declarations rapidly, were reserved for persons outside the State or not
physically able to attend the court. Fifth, adjournments are reduced. Order 17, Rules 1
and 2 state that the court shall not grant more than three adjournments to either party
in the suit. Adjournments shall only be granted once the party requesting the delay
shows su¢ cient cause. In each adjournment, the court shall make an order specifying
the costs assumed by the other party as a result of the adjournment. The court may
also award higher costs if it deems t.
It is interesting to note that lawyers initially resisted the reform. The 2002 Amend-
ment Act was originally written in 1999 and had even secured Presidential assent. How-
ever, lawyers opposed to a number of the Bills provisions resisted its notication in
February 2000 by resorting to a country-wide strike. In Tamil Nadu, court functioning
was paralyzed for more than 10 days. Lawyers argued that the amendments would not
only increase litigation costs, but increase delays. In New Delhi, lawyers were lathi-
charged4 during a demonstration. As a result of the protests, then Union Law Minister
Ram Jethmalani, decided to keep the Act in abeyance. The 1999 Act provoked protests
mainly because Jethmalani showed little sensitivity to the lawyersobjections. Another
criticism was that it facilitated the recording of evidence by commissioners as opposed
to the examination of witnesses in open court. As a commissioner could be anyone, be
he a retired judicial o¢ cer or a practising lawyer the 1999 Act did not provide precise
criteria this was an obvious infringement on lawyersauthority. Jethmalanis succes-
sor, Arun Jaitley, introduced a fresh amendment Bill later in 2000, taking into account
suggestions from bar representatives, political parties and the Law Commission5. The
act was met with little resistance6 and came into e¤ect in 2002.
The 2002 Amendment Act contains 89 amendments. I examined each one and found
57 likely to inuence judicial speed. Codifying an amendment as +1 if it is thought to
increase speed and -1 if it is thought to reduce speed gave me a gure of +38, which
allowed me to conclude that the Act is likely to increase judicial speed.
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Figure 1 shows the number of cases pending per judge in Indias Lower Courts be-
tween 2000 and 2004. It shows a sharp reduction in the number of cases pending after
2002. This is not obvious: when judicial e¢ ciency improves, people seek judicial help
under the belief that it will be forthcoming. An increase in solved cases resulting from
the reform could be accompanied by an increase in led cases, which suggests greater
public condence in the judiciary. The impact on overall duration of case treatment
would be ambiguous. A decrease in cases pending per judge in 2002 followed by an
increase in 2003 would be consistent with the explanation according to which it took
one year for people to le more cases due to their renewed condence in the judiciary.
This analysis cannot however disentangle the reforms e¤ects from other changes
having occurred in 2002. I will now describe a particular feature of this reform which
implied that there was some spatial variation in its implementation.
2.2 Identication strategy
2.2.1 Description
The papers identication strategy relies on the fact that several of the 89 amendments
of the 2002 Amendment Act had previously been enacted in a number of States. Under
Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, High Courts have power to amend, by
rules, procedure laid down in Code orders. If a given State had already enacted a
particular amendment later contained in the 2002 Amendment Act, then this particular
amendment must have had no e¤ect in that State in 2002 compared to the rest of the
country. I therefore read every order of the Code of Civil Procedure, veried whether it
had been amended by the 2002 Amendment Act, codied its likely impact on speed (+1
if thought to increase speed and -1 if thought to reduce speed), and veried whether any
of Indias States had previously passed the same amendment. The total impact of the
2002 Amendment Act for a particular State will be decreased by one if that State had
already passed a positive amendment of it7.
A concrete example can be found in Order 26 Rule 4A. Rule 4A was added by the
2002 Amendment Act:
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"Commission for examination of any person resident within the
local limits of the jurisdiction of the court.-Notwithstanding anything
contained in these rules, any court, may in the interest of justice or for the
expeditious disposal of the case or for any other reason, issue commission in
any suit for the examination, on interrogatories or otherwise, of any person
resident within the local limits of its jurisdiction, and the evidence so recorded
shall be read in evidence."
The same amendment was enacted in Rajasthan in 1973. Commissions have there-
fore been in use there for any person resident within local limits of court jurisdiction
from 1973 onwards. This amendment of the 2002 Amendment Act will have no impact
in Rajasthan in 2002 as compared to other Indian States. The question arises as to
why Rajasthan already passed such an amendment. It might indicate that Rajasthan
was simply more advanced as a State. This unobserved heterogeneity will lead to
a spurious correlation between the reform and economic outcomes. I will respond to
this claim in two ways. First, I will use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis, comparing
States less inuenced by the 2002 Amendment Act to the other States, before and after
the reform. This empirical strategy accounts for any time-constant State heterogeneity.
The only remaining concern of such an analysis is the assumption of common time ef-
fects: treatedand untreatedStates should evolve in similar fashion. The question
is therefore whether amendments enacted in the past have any bearing on the evolu-
tion of judicial quality in 2002, coinciding with the 2002 Amendment Act. This is the
identication assumption: secondly, I will assume that previously enacted amendments
were potentially responsive to economic and political conditions of the time but had no
bearing on the evolution of judicial quality in 2002, except through their attenuation of
the 2002 Amendment Act. In other words, they were enacted so long ago that they can
be considered predetermined. This is conrmed by their time distribution. I found 106
State amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure identical to the 89 amendments of the
2002 Amendment Act8. They were enacted on average in 1969 (standard error of 17).
The last State amendment was enacted in 1994. Figure 2 shows their distribution over
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time. It is clear from this gure that most were enacted quite some time ago. In other
words, they may be considered predetermined.
Other amendments are less straightforward. A peculiar example is Order 20, Rule
1. This describes when a judgement is to be pronounced. A court must pronounce
judgement 15 days from the date on which the case hearing was concluded, or 30 in
exceptional circumstances. The 2002 Amendment Act changed these two numbers to 30
and 60 respectively. This goes against the objective of facilitating swift disposal of cases
and is thus codied as a -1. However, Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry and Andhra Pradesh
States passed an amendment in 1930 specifying that no time limits are to be imposed
on courts. As the 2002 Amendment Act overrules all previous legislation, the impact in
these three States will be positive as time limits are now imposed, whereas the impact of
the reform in other States will be negative as longer time limits are imposed. I therefore
place a +2 for these three States in order to specify that the overall impact on them
should be positive (-1+2) as opposed to all others which receive a -1.
Another example is Order 58, Rule 1. This rule species the duration of civil prison
detention for a judgement-debtor who has not satised the decree against him. The
changes resulting from the 2002 Amendment Act are noted in parentheses. He is to
be detained for no more than three months if the decree requires him to pay a sum of
money exceeding 1,000 Rs. (5,000). He shall be detained for no more than six weeks
if the decree requires him to pay a sum of money between 500 (2,000) and 1,000 Rs.
(5,000). This change was obviously made to adjust for the depreciation of the Rupee.
However, in 2002, some judgement debtors who would have gone to civil prison under
the previous code were not required to so under the 2002 Amendment Act. This incites
judgement debtors to delay payment of decrees since they will not be sent to prison
for doing so. I therefore codify this amendment in the 2002 Amendment Act as a -1.
However, West Bengal enacted an amendment in 1967 that was harsher: judgement
debtors are to be detained for six months if their payment decree exceeds the sum of
50 Rs. and six weeks in other cases. As the 2002 Amendment Act overrules previous
litigation, its impact in West Bengal will be even more negative than in the rest of the
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country which had softer laws. I therefore added a -1 to West Bengal compared to the
other states.
These three examples give an idea of the spatial variation in the likely e¤ect of the
2002 Amendment Act. Figure 3 shows the cumulative impact of the amendments already
present in the 2002 Amendment Act for each State. An amendment is codied as +1 if
it increases judicial speed, -1 if it decreases judicial speed. Figure 4 shows gives the same
graph for hypothetical States 1 and 2. This gure represents State 1 which enacted some
amendments already present in the 2002 Amendment Act as opposed to State 2. The
impact of the 2002 Amendment Act will therefore be lower for State 1 than for State
2. Figure 5 depicts the evolution of a particular outcome of interest (for example the
number of cases pending per judge) for State 1 and 2. I do not expect the outcome to be
similar before the reform. Indeed, State 1 enacted amendments likely to have increased
judicial speed. Though State 1 may be systematically di¤erent from State 2, the reform
should equalize their outcomes, since the 2002 Amendment Act overrules past litigation.
It is therefore possible to isolate the causal impact of the reform by comparing outcomes
for State 1 and 2 before and after the reform. The systematic di¤erence between both
States is taken into account if the outcome of state 1 is di¤erenced before and after the
reform. It is also possible to disentangle the e¤ect of the reform from any coincidental
change by di¤erencing between State1 and 2 after the reform (and before) as both evolve
in the same macroeconomic context. This is the intuition of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
analysis.
It is reassuring to see an example of the hypothetical situation I described in Figures
4 and 5. Figure 6 represents the number of cases pending per judge in Lower Courts
in India between 2000 and 2004. The Delhi and Uttar Pradesh examples are striking.
Uttar Pradesh experienced many positive changes that became redundant with the 2002
Amendment Act, whereas Delhi experienced only one amendment, as visible in Figure
3. I expect the e¤ect of the reform to be stronger in Delhi than in Uttar Pradesh. In
Figure 6, we see that Uttar Pradesh experienced a slight attening of its number of cases
pending per judge, whereas Delhi experienced a decrease in the number of cases pending
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per judge after 2002. This is graphical evidence of di¤erent cross-State implementation
of the 2002 Amendment Act due to amendments having been previously enacted in
certain States. I will now present statistical tests of the identication strategy.
2.2.2 Tests of the identication strategy
To relate the judicial reform to the speed of the judiciary, I perform regressions of the
following sort:
pendingst = s + t + 2002AmendmentActs  (post2002t) + (s  trendt) + "st
where s corresponds to the State and t to time (between 1999 and 2006). The dependent
variable pendingst is the number of cases pending per judge in Lower Courts in India
in 35 states and 8 years. Cases pending in Lower Courts in India were obtained from
Annual Reports, Ministry of Law & Justice & Past Issue, Govt. of India. Numbers
of Judges were obtained from various Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha questions. s are
State xed e¤ects, t year xed e¤ects. The variable 2002AmendmentActs is the net
impact of the 2002 Amendment Act once taken into account the fact that some states
already enacted some amendments in the past. Therefore, this variable varies by state.
It is interacted with post2002t equal to 1 if the year of observation is after 2002. The
coe¢ cient of interest is therefore . Additionally, state dummies interacted with a time
trend are included. Standard errors are robust.
The main advantage of this di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis is that it controls for
State and year xed e¤ects. In other words, constant State unobserved heterogeneity
and time e¤ects are controlled for. Column (1) of Table (1) present the main result and
illustrates the positive impact of the 2002 Act. One extra amendment decreased by 676
the number of cases pending per judge in the Lower Courts which represents 35% of a
workload. The e¤ect is statistically signicant at 10% and indicates that the reform was
successful in reducing case backlog.
To isolate the reforms causal impact, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy relies on
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the assumption of common time e¤ects: States where the impact of the 2002 Amend-
ment Act was minimal (due to their having previously passed the same amendments)
should have evolved in the same way as States where the reform had considerable im-
pact, had they been subjected to the same reforms impact. In other words, States in
which the impact was low might evolve di¤erently from other States. This is a criti-
cal assumption as States have made an endogenous choice when enacting amendments.
Besley et al (2000) argue that State reforms are responsive to economic, political or
judicial conditions within that State. It is necessary to identify and account for the
forces that led to the amending of the Code of Civil Procedure if unbiased estimates
of the 2002 Acts e¤ects are to be obtained. However, as I have already argued, the
amendments were enacted a long time ago (on average in 1969) and were responsive to
the economic, political or judicial conditions of the time, not of 2002. They are thus
predetermined. They most certainly inuenced the number of cases pending before 2002,
this inter-State systematic di¤erence being accounted for in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
analysis. But one could argue that the past amendments have had no inuence on the
evolution of the number of cases pending in 2002, except through their attenuation of
the 2002 Amendment Act.
This reason is not entirely satisfactory as one could easily retort that States which
made these changes for themselves are probably on a di¤erent time-path than States
which had to have a national-level amendment act imposed on them. One can also
hypothesize the direction of the bias according to the following scenario. It is possible
that States that adopted some amendments early did so since they saw increases in cases
pending. Let us now assume that the 2002 Amendment Act and any amendment to the
Code of Civil Procedure have no e¤ect on the speed of the judiciary. In this case, the
number of cases pending kept increasing over time in these states. The 2002 Amendment
Act would have no e¤ect on the speed of the judiciary in 2002 but a regression would
still measure an impact since the time trend implies that states with a low number of
2002 amendments (due to their many past amendments) have more cases pending in
2002 than in 2001.
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To counter this argument, I include state dummies interacted with time trends (s 
trendt) in the regressions. This captures the di¤erent time-paths followed by States. In
column (1), the impact of the reform is statistically signicant when state-time trends
are included.
In columns (2) to (4), I test whether the identication strategy relies on a particular
set of States. One concern is about Union Territories. These territories are administered
by the central government but they still possess di¤erent High Courts that could amend
the Code of Civil Procedure in di¤erent ways. In column (2), Union Territories (An-
daman & Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, Delhi,
Lakshadweep, Pondicherry) are excluded and the result remains similar. Another con-
cern is about the North-Eastern States. These States have the same High Court due
to their small size and proximity. In column (3), the North-Eastern states (Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura) are ex-
cluded and the result remains the same9. In column (4), only the 16 biggest states of
India representing more than 92% of the Indian population are included. The impact of
the 2002 Amendment Act is even more statistically signicant.
A nal test of the identication strategy is a falsication exercise. If the identication
strategy is correct, then the past amendments should have no impact on the change in
the number of cases pending except through their attenuation of the 2002 Amendment
Act. A way to test this is to look at the impact of past amendments on the change
in the number of cases pending in 2001 (before the reform). Past amendments surely
had an impact at the time they were enacted but should not inuence the evolution of
judicial speed before and after the reform. In column (5), the net impact of the 2002
Amendment Actper state is interacted with the 8 year dummies. Only the interaction
between the past amendments and the 2002 year dummy is signicantly di¤erent from
0. This directly tests the common time e¤ects assumption: States with a low or high
number of past amendments did not experience a di¤erent evolution before the reform.
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3 Data
This paper aims to show that the reform a¤ected rmsbehavior. To do this, I use two
representative samples of small informal rms in India. Although there is no unique
denition of informal sector, for the purpose of the Indian National Sample Survey, all
unincorporated enterprises which operate on either proprietary or partnership basis are
considered to constitute the informal sector. A corporation is a legal entity (technically,
a juristic person) which has a separate legal personality from its members. One of the
dening legal rights and obligations of the corporation is the ability to sue and be sued.
This means that the rm owners considered in this sample cannot sue in the name of
their rm, but they may still sue or be sued in their own name. The theoretical reasons
as to why the judiciary could impact economic outcomes are valid for informal rms.
There is evidence that rms use the judiciary in India. In a separate dataset from
the 2001 National Sample Survey focused on consumption, I calculated that 1% of the
households paid legal fees in that year. This represents 11 million persons. Additionally,
data on Courts from the Annual Ministry Reports show that 3 million cases were led
in 2002. Finally but on a more anecdotal level, the witnessing of the overcrowded Tis
Azari District Court in New Delhi could corroborate this statement. Even if informal
rms fail to make explicit use of courts, the theoretical model presented in this paper
emphasizes the fact that judiciaries inuence rmsbehavior thorough the perception
rms have of judiciaries.
The 55th Round of Indias National Sample Survey collected in 1999/2000 contains
information on 170,000 small non-agricultural rms.10 The 57th round, collected in
2002, contains information on 350,000 small non-agricultural rms specializing in services
(hotels and restaurants, transport, storage, communications, real estate, renting and
business activities, education, health and social work). I included sector dummies in the
empirical analysis in order to compare rms in identical sectors (the dataset includes the
sector in which the rm operates according to the 5-digit level of the National Industry
Classication). A potential problem arises from the time of the data collection. The
Amendment Act was implemented in May 2002 while the dataset was collected during
20
2002. One might argue that it was too soon for rms in the 57th Round to le cases and
experience the increased judicial speed resulting from the reform. Two comments can
be made. First, the theoretical model presented in this paper emphasizes the fact that
judiciaries inuence rmsbehavior even when rms fail to make explicit use of them.
It is based on the perception rms have of judiciaries. Second, one may argue that rms
were aware that the implementation of the reform was imminent and thus modied their
behavior from 2002 onwards. The enactment of the 2002 Amendment Act was highly
publicized due to the lawyersstrike described in the previous section.
Several characteristics of the dataset make it appropriate for use in identifying the
impact of judicial delays on rmsbehavior. First, a detailed list of problems experienced
by the rm was collected. Each rm reported whether or not non-recovery of service
charges, fees or credit hindered its operation. I interpret this problem as a breach of
contract. Second, a detailed questionnaire regarding types of investment undertaken is
also available, providing information on whether or not the rm added plants and ma-
chinery, tools, transport equipment or land to its assets. Third, information is provided
regarding access to credit markets. Each rm was asked whether or not capital shortfalls
hindered its operation. Additionally, a wealth of information on loan sources is reported.
I know whether loans were granted from formal nancial institutions (central and State-
level term lending institutions; central, State or local governments; public sector banks
or other institutional agencies), money lenders, business partners, suppliers/contractors,
or friends and relatives. Fourth, information is provided on production goods ownership.
I know whether or not a rm hires or owns its plant and machinery, tools, transport
equipment or land. This wealth of information allows me to test each proposition made
in the theoretical analysis. I will now describe the empirical method used.
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4 Empirical Procedure
To relate the judicial reform to the behavior of rms, I perform regressions of the fol-
lowing sort:
yijst = s + 2002t + 2002AmendmentActs  2002t + xst + dj + "ijst
where i corresponds to the rm, s to the State, t to time (2000 or 2002) and j the sector
of the rm. The variable yist represents the outcome variable of interest; this will rst
be the rms experience of breach of contract, access to nancial markets, investment,
renting decisions and later its performance. In this specication, determinants of the
outcome include State xed e¤ects (s), year xed e¤ects (2002t = 1 if t = 2002,
0 if t = 2000), an interaction term between the 2002 year dummy and the variable
2002AmendmentActs (the latter is equal to the impact in particular State s of the 2002
Amendment Act calculated according to the methodology developed in Section 2.2.1),
State-level controls (xst), and sector-xed e¤ects (dist). The coe¢ cient of interest is
therefore .
The main advantage of this di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis is that it enables me to
control for State and year xed e¤ects. In other words, constant State unobserved het-
erogeneity and time e¤ects are controlled for. Two main problems remain: common time
e¤ects and serial correlation in the disturbance term. I will now present my corrections
to these three problems.
To isolate the reforms causal impact, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy relies
on the assumption of common time e¤ects: rms in States where the impact of the
2002 Amendment Act was minimal (due to their having previously passed the same
amendments) should have evolved between 2000 and 2002 in the same way as rms in
States where the reform had considerable impact , had they been in such a State. In other
words, States in which the impact was low might evolve di¤erently from other States. In
section 2.2.2, I already showed that the identication strategy was robust to the inclusion
of State time trends. I cannot replicate this analysis in this section as there are only two
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points in time (2000 and 2002). No similar datasets. on informal rms was collected
before 2000. In this section, I control for State-level changes that may have occurred
at the same time and that may have blurred the impact of the reform by including
State-level controls (xst)11. I control for the per capita State-wide amount released
for developing judicial infrastructure and facilities in order to account for coincidental
increases in budgets allocated to the judiciary. I also control for the potential coincidental
improvement in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. I consider two institutions
in particular: fast-track courts and Lok Adalats. Fast track courts are designed to
expeditiously clear colossal rates of pendency in district and subordinate courts under a
time-bound programme12. I therefore include in the regressions the number of fast-track
courts functioning per capita and per capita State-level nancial assistance released
for these fast-track courts. The other alternative dispute resolution mechanism is the
Lok Adalat (peoples courts)13. I therefore include in the regression the per capita
number of cases disposed by Lok Adalats at the State-level to control for any coincidental
improvement in Lok Adalats quality. I also control for police force quality which may
inuence contract breaches on the part of rms. I include the number of policemen for
every 1000 people and total police expenditure per policemen. When outcomes concern
rmsaccess to nancial institutions, I include variables to account for the States overall
nancial development such as the State-level ratio of aggregate deposits to the total
credit of public sector banks and the State-level number of public sector bank o¢ ces
per capita. When the outcome concerns the rmseconomic performance, I include the
growth rate of State-level net domestic product per capita. This allows me to control
for any macroeconomic change that may have occurred between 2000 and 2002. These
variables control for State-level trends that may have occurred between 2000 and 2002
and that may have inuenced the outcomes under consideration.
The second problem regards serial correlation in the disturbance term (Bertrand et
al, 2004). This is not a major concern, since I only consider two periods of observation.
A potentially more important problem is the serial correlation for rms in the same
State (Moulton, 1990). To deal with this problem, I cluster the standard errors at the
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State level.
I also include sector dummies (dj) to control for sector-specic e¤ects. I use sim-
ple probit regressions when the outcome is a dummy variable. Rather than reporting
coe¢ cients, I report the change in the probability for an innitesimal change in each
independent variable at the mean. Multipliers, dened as the inverse of the probability
that the observation is included due to the sampling design, are used as weights in the
regressions in order to have a representative sample. I now discuss the results relating
to the four theoretical predictions found in section 1.
5 Results
This paper seeks to relate spatial variation in the implementation of the 2002 Amend-
ment Act to rm outcomes likely to have been inuenced by judicial e¢ ciency (or lack
thereof). The theoretical section showed that judiciaries a¤ect the probability of ex-
periencing breaches of contract, investment incentives, access to nancial markets and
decisions on whether to rent or own production goods. I will now test these four predic-
tions using the empirical methodology outlined in Section 3.
Table 2 examines the relationship between contracting behavior and the 2002 Amend-
ment Act. The dependent variable is the occurrence of contract breaches. It was ob-
tained from a list of problems commonly experienced by rms. The non-recovery of
service charges/ fees/ creditis one such problem. It relates to cases in which a breach
of contract had occurred. I thus constructed a dummy variable equal to 1 in cases where
the rm experienced this type of problem as one of its main problems, and 0 if it did not.
In Column (1), I included State xed e¤ects, year xed e¤ects and a term called "2002
Amendment Act" which is the interaction between the year 2002 dummy and the number
of amendments likely to increase speed for each State. As outlined in Section 2.2, there
is spatial variation in this index since some States had previously enacted amendments
present in the 2002 Act. The coe¢ cient indicates that an amendment likely to increase
speed in the 2002 Act decreases the probability of experiencing a breach of contract by
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0.73 percentage point. This coe¢ cient is statistically signicant. It is also economically
signicant. There are 38 amendments in the 2002 Amendment Act likely to increase
speed. However, multiplying this result by 38 would extrapolate the results given by the
regressions since there is little variation in the index measuring spatial variation in the
implementation of the 2002 Act. Instead, it is worthwhile to compare this result to the
probability of experiencing a breach of contract, which concerns 6 percent of the rms.
Thus, an amendment likely to increase judicial speed in the 2002 Act decreases the prob-
ability of experiencing a breach of contract by 12 percent. In Column (2), I added NIC2
dummies. This corresponds to the National Industrial Classication, disaggregated to
the second level. 42 NIC2 dummies were included to account for the fact that the 57th
Round of the National Sample Survey focuses on services rms. The coe¢ cient does not
vary. In Column (3), NIC3 dummies are included. This corresponds to the National
Industrial Classication, disaggregated to the third level. 119 NIC3 dummies were in-
cluded. The e¤ect remains similar. In Column (4), State-level controls, as described
previously, are included. The coe¢ cient remains remarkably similar. This result con-
rms the fact that the e¤ect on the probability of experiencing a contract breach comes
from procedural reform and not from coincidental changes in judicial infrastructure, the
quality of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as the fast-track courts or Lok
Adalats and police force quality. Table 2 conrms Proposition 1 stating that more ef-
cient judiciaries are associated with less breaches of contract. Table 2 also provides a
policy implication in the sense that this procedural reform a¤ects a rms probability of
experiencing a breach of contract.
Table 3 examines the relationship between the reform and investment incentive. The
explanatory variable of interest is the index that interacts the year 2002 dummy with
the number of amendments likely to increase speed from the 2002 Amendment Act in
a particular State. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the net addition to plant
and machinery assets under ownership during last 365 days. This variable is equal to 1
if the enterprise experienced a net addition to plant and machinery assets, 0 otherwise.
An extra amendment likely to increase speed in the 2002 Act increases the probability
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of investing in plant and machinery assets by 0.4 percentage points. This is a sizeable
impact given that only 3 percent of rms invest in plant and machinery assets. The
dependent variable in Column (2) is the net addition to tools and other xed assets
owned during last 365 days (1 if the enterprise made such an investment, 0 otherwise).
Another amendment likely to increase judicial speed also increases the probability of
investing in tools and other xed assets by 4 percentage points, given that 17 percent
of rms invest in tools. The dependent variable in Column (3) is the net addition to
transport and equipment assets owned during last 365 days (1 if the enterprise made
such an investment, 0 otherwise). The e¤ect is also quite important. The dependent
variable in Column (4) is the net addition to land assets owned during last 365 days (1 if
the enterprise made such an investment, 0 otherwise). The coe¢ cient is not signicant
for land assets. The proposition therefore seems to hold for production goods but not
for land assets.
Table 4 examines the inuence of the judiciary on rmsaccess to credit markets. The
dependent variable is information on loans and the explanatory variable of interest is the
interaction between the year 2002 dummy and the number of amendments likely to have
increased speed in each State. The dependent variable used in the Column (1) regression
is a dummy variable equal to 1 in cases where the rm experienced a shortage of capital
as one of its problems, and 0 otherwise. One amendment likely to increase e¢ ciency
in the 2002 Amendment act decreases the probability of experiencing capital shortfalls
by 6 percentage points. This result is statistically signicant and rather large when
compared to the fact that 25% of rms experience problem of capital shortfalls. This
regression includes State xed e¤ects, year xed e¤ects, NIC3 dummies and State level
controls. I include the same State level controls as in Table 2, and add some variables
that account for the development of the nancial sector, such as the State-wide ratio of
aggregate deposits to total credit of public sector banks and the State-wide number of
public sector bank o¢ ces per capita. This is to control for any coincidental change in the
depth of the State nancial sector14. The rest of the table restricts the sample to rms
having obtained loans in order to test Proposition 2, which states that more rms will
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receive loans from formal nancial institutions and less from friends when judicial quality
increases. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the probability of obtaining loans
from formal nancial institutions such as government or banks. I found that with one
extra amendment of the 2002 Act increasing judicial speed, the probability of obtaining
a loan from a formal nancial institution (conditional on obtaining a loan) increases by
almost 5 percentage points. In Column (3), the dependent variable is the probability of
obtaining a loan from a business friend (contractor, moneylender) if the enterprise did
in fact obtain a loan. The coe¢ cient is positive, which shows that a better judiciary
is associated with more loans from contractors where an e¢ cient judiciary is key to
recovering the defaulted loans. However, the e¤ect is not statistically signicant. The
dependent variable in Column (4) is the probability of obtaining a loan from a relative
(or business partner) if the enterprise obtained a loan. The result is not statistically
signicant.
Table 5 looks at the relationship between the reform and the propensity of small in-
formal rms to rent. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the enterprise is renting some
of its production goods15. The four categories of production goods (plant and machin-
ery assets, tool assets, transport and equipment assets and land assets) are considered
in the four columns. I nd that the 2002 Amendment Act does not have any impact
on the propensity to rent plant and machinery assets. However, one extra amendment
increased the propensity to rent tools and other xed assets by 0.3 percentage point.
This an economically signicant result compared to the fact that 1.7 percent of the pop-
ulation rented tools. The e¤ect is not so strong for transport and equipment assets and
negative for land assets. But the magnitude of this coe¢ cient is small compared to the
fact that 35 percent of the population are renting land assets.
Results indicate that the four theoretical predictions obtained from the model seem
to hold in the data. Considering that experiencing less breaches of contract, investing
more, having a better access to nancial markets and to thicker rental markets are
positive determinants of rmseconomic performance, I now turn to the e¤ects of this
reform on the expansion of small informal rms.
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6 E¤ects on Firm Performance
This paper seeks to determine whether a judicial reform that seems to be correlated
with an increased speed of the judiciary a¤ect not only rm-level behavior but also
rm-level performance. Table 6 examines the relationship between this reform and the
performance of the rm. The dependent variable is now the growth status of the rm. It
is a subjective measure since it was asked directly of rm owners. It is a dummy variable
equal to one if the rm is expanding or constant, to zero if the rm is shrinking. In
column (1), the explanatory variables include State xed e¤ects, year xed e¤ects and the
index measuring the number of amendments e¤ectively implemented in the State. The
coe¢ cient is statistically positively signicant and indicates that one extra amendment
improving the procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure increases the probability for the
rm to be expanding by 1.2 percentage point. The proportion of rms saying that their
rms was expanding or constant is 74 percent. This means that an extra amendment
increases the proportion of rms expanding or constant by 1.7 percent. This is the e¤ect
of just one amendment of the 2002 Amendment Act. But the number of amendments
passed varied between 34 and 40. Another interpretation would be to say that moving a
rm from an average State with the lowest number of amendments passed to the highest
number of amendments passed will increase its probability to be expanding or constant
by 7.2 percentage point, in other words the proportion of rms expanding increases by
9.7 percent in a State with the highest as opposed to the lowest number of amendments
passed . It is also worthwhile remembering that the 2002 Amendment Act contains
38 amendments likely to increase speed. In column (2), I control for the same State
level controls I have used in section 5. The coe¢ cient stays constant. In Column (3), I
add the growth rate of the State net domestic product per capita to control for States
economic development. The coe¢ cient remains statistically positive. This means that
the e¤ect is not just due to a coincidental State-specic macroeconomic improvement.
It is also interesting to investigate the e¤ect of the reform on the decision to start a
company. An entrepreneur in a State with a speedy judiciary knows that he will su¤er
less from breaches of contract, be protected in case of appropriation of his investment
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rents, have better access to formal nancial institutions and to thicker rental markets.
An entrepreneur will therefore be more willing to start his own company. The dependent
variable in column (4) is now equal to 1 if the rm operated for less than 3 years, in
other words a new rm, 0 otherwise. This is a measure of the new rms created in each
State. One extra amendment increases the likelihood to be a new rm having operated
for less than three years by 0.9 percentage point. Given that 14.9% rms in the sample
were new, it means that an extra amendment increased the proportion of new rms by
6 percent. A State with the biggest impact from the 2002 Amendment Act, in other
words with the most number of amendments enacted in 2002, has 36 percent more new
rms than a State with the smallest impact of the 2002 Amendment Act.
7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the quality of judicial institutions in Indian States matters
for both small rmsbehavior and their economic performance. My ndings are in line
with an emerging, largely macroeconomic literature (Djankov et al (2002), Acemoglu et
al (2001), Rodrik et al (2002), for example), underlining the importance of institutions
in economic performance. The identication strategy in this paper allows me to isolate
the causal impact of one type of institution, the judiciary, on rmsoutcomes. I use the
spatial variation in the implementation of a judicial reform, the 2002 Amendment Act,
with the objective of facilitating speedy disposal of cases. This spatial variation is due to
the fact that some States already enacted some of the amendments contained in the 2002
Amendment Act. These States will therefore feel a weaker e¤ect of the 2002 Amendment
Act in 2002. I argue that the amendments already enacted were passed a long time ago
and can be considered predetermined. Additionally, a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy
accounts for unobserved State heterogeneity.
I found that this reform was e¤ective in the sense that it decreased the number of
cases pending per judge in Lower Courts. I then used repeated cross-sections of rm-level
data that contains much information on non-recovery of service charges/fees/credit, in-
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vestment decisions, whether a rm is capital constrained, sources of borrowing and forms
of ownership of production goods for small informal non-agricultural rms specialized in
services. I found that this reform and therefore a speedier judiciary decreases the proba-
bility to experience a breach of contract, increases the incentives to invest, decreases the
probability to experience shortage of capital, favors access to formal nancial institutions
and thickens rental markets. These results indicate that the quality of judiciaries across
Indian States plays an important role in shaping economic activity in this important sec-
tor of the economy. Moreover, I found that having faster courts is positively associated
with rm performance. My results are consistent with a simple game theoretic model
illustrating how slower judiciaries a¤ect agentsbehavior in contracting relationships.
This theorys key insights are that rm owners in slow judiciary environments are more
likely to break contracts, less likely to engage in investments, more likely to be credit
constrained, less likely to have access to formal credit and less likely to have access to
rental markets.
This paper not only suggests that the judiciary shape economic activity but also
suggests a way to improve it by modifying the procedures to treat of a case. This
research leaves important questions open concerning the political economy of such a
reform. It raises the question as to why this reform was not implemented earlier if it
is so benecial for small rms. An unanswered question concerns whether the e¤ects of
a slow judiciary vary across sectors of an economy. One can imagine for example that
rms in Indias registered or formal manufacturing sector may have fewer contracting
problems than informal rms I examined in this paper. One can also imagine that some
economic agents or rms could benet from a slow judiciary by using it as a way to delay
bad outcomes. These vested interests could perturb the enactment of such a reform. In
future work, I plan to extend my analysis to rms in other sectors of the Indian economy
as a means of testing this hypothesis.
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1To be more precise, I will consider in the empirical section of this paper plant and machinery assets,
tools and other xed assets, land assets, transport and equipment assets.
2Laws Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parliamentary standing com-
mittee on Home a¤airs, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. http://rajyasabha.nic.in/
book2/reports/home_a¤/85threport%20.htm
3Krishnamoorty, Dasu, Judicial Delays, Indolink, editorial analysis, 2003
4A lathi is a 6 to 8 foot long bamboo stick tipped with a metal blunt
5http://www.hinduonnet.com/ine/1914/19141020.htm
6resistance was even weaker thanks to a Supreme Court decision on December 18, 2002, which alleged
that lawyers had no right to strike, pronounce a boycott, or engage in a token strike, since these actions
deny the fundamental right of access to justice on the part of the litigant public.
http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/03jan17/edit.htm#4
7The complete example for Uttar Pradesh is shown in Data Appendix 1.
8I found only 82 State amendments identical to the 57 amendments related to speed in the 2002
Amendment Act.
9In the microeconomic analysis, proper weights will be used in the dataset, e¤ectively dealing with
this matter.
10See Data Appendix 2 for details on variables.
11See Data Appendix 2 for some descriptive statistics and sources of the variables.
12An objective of the ve-year experimental scheme begun in 2001 was to prioritize basis sessions
and other cases involving undertrials. The scheme envisaged appointing ad hoc judges from among
retired sessions or additional sessions judges with explicit productivity incentives: fast track courts are
required to dispose of 14 sessions trial cases or 20 to 25 criminal or civil cases per month.
13The latter were established by the government in 1986 to settle disputes through conciliation and
compromise. Their main condition is that the disputing parties must agree on settlement. Lok Adalat
decisions are binding and its orders are capable of being executed through the legal process. No appeal
lies against Lok Adalat orders. There are no court fees.
14The result is robust to a variety of specications with and without controls but the most complete
specication is shown.
15an alternative dependent variable equal to 1 if the rm was a global renter in the particular pro-
duction good of interest (market value of production good hired superior to market value of production
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Figure 2: Distibution over time of the amendments already enacted
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Figure 3: Amendments already present in the 2002 Amendment Act
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Figure 4: Illustration of the identication strategy







Figure 5: Outcome for state 1 and 2
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Table 2: Impact of the 2002 Amendment Act on the probability
to experience a breach of contract
(1) (2) (3) (4)
non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit
2002 Amendment Act -0.0073 -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0072
(-2.67)*** (-2.69)*** (-2.65)*** (-2.91)***
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
NIC2 dummies No Yes No No
NIC3 dummies No No Yes Yes
State-Level Controls No No No Yes
Observations 537454 537396 537141 527547
Robust z statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * signicant at
10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The dependent variable is the probability to
experience a problem of non- recovery of service charges / fees/ credit. This variable is equal
to 1 if the entreprise experienced such a problem, 0 otherwise. The variable 2002 Amendment
Act is the net impact of the 2002 Amendment Act once taken into account the fact that
some states already enacted some amendments in the past. Therefore, this variable varies
by state. State dummies and Year Dummies are included. In column (2), NIC2 dummies are
included. This corresponds to the National Industrial Classication, disaggregated to the
second level. 42 NIC2 dummies were included. In column (3), NIC3 dummies are included.
This corresponds to the National Industrial Classication, disaggregated to the third level.
119 NIC3 dummies were included. In column (4), state-level controls are included: number
of fast-track courts functioning per capita, state-wise nancial assistance released for fast-
track courts per capita, state-wise number of cases disposed o¤ in Lok Adalats per capita,
state-wise amount released for development of infrastructural facilities for judiciary in India
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Impact of the 2002 Amendment Act on the status
of the entreprise and on rms creation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
status of the enterprise probability to be a
new enterprise
2002 Amendment Act 0.0122 0.0159 0.0313 0.0089
(1.66)* (2.73)*** (3.20)*** (1.71)*
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
NIC3 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Level Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Growth controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 537424 527830 489510 489432
Robust z statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * signicant at 10%;
** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and
(3) is the status of the entreprise over the last three years. It is equal to 1 if the entreprise
is expanding or constant , to 0 if the entreprise is contracting. The dependent variable in
column (4) is equal to 1 if the rm operated for less than 3 years, in other words a new rm, 0
otherwise. The variable 2002 Amendment Act is the net impact of the 2002 Amendment Act
once taken into account the fact that some states already enacted some amendments in the
past. Therefore, this variable varies by state. State dummies and Year Dummies are included.
NIC3 dummies are always included. This corresponds to the National Industrial Classication,
disaggregated to the third level. 119 NIC3 dummies were included. In column (1), no controls
are included. In column (2) , the following state-level controls are included: number of fast-
track courts functioning per capita, state-wise nancial assistance released for fast-track courts
per capita, state-wise number of cases disposed o¤ in Lok Adalats per capita, state-wise amount
released for development of infrastructural facilities for judiciary in India per capita, number of
policemen per one thousand of population, total police expenditure per policemen. In column
(3), additional state-level controls are included: state-wise ratio of aggregate deposits to total
credit of public sector banks and state-wise number of bank o¢ ces of public sector banks per
capita. I also included in column (3) the growth rate of the state net domestic product per
capita to control for stateseconomic development.
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